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Abstract
A society can reap more benets from an improvement in communication and trans-
portation when the gap between privileged and less-privileged individuals is narrow.
This hypothesis is investigated in a Kiyotaki-Wright search environment where peo-
ple enjoy di¤erent rental positions. Historical evidence concerning the rise of Italian
seaport cities during the Middle Ages, of the Netherlands in the 17th century, and
the nobilitys resistance to trade in pre-revolutionary France is used to support the
hypothesis.
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1 Introduction
It has been argued that when an economy stagnates, it is often because the most capable
people choose to be occupied in rent-seeking activities over alternatives that would improve
the societys welfare (Krueger, 1974, Baumol, 1990, 1993, 2002, and Murphy, Shleifer and
Vishny, 1991, 1993). Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1991) (henceforth MSV) suggest that
good communications and transportation that facilitate trade can direct people toward more
socially useful occupations (see their Table 1, p. 519).
Though this suggestion is sound, their contribution lacks a formal analysis of how and
under what conditions improved contacts among individuals can induce some to devote
greater e¤ort to socially useful activities. This paper provides such an analysis using a variant
of the Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) (henceforth KW ) search model. There are two aspects
of the KW environment that are useful for evaluating MSVs conjecture. First, because
exchanges occur in decentralized markets, it is possible to be explicit about shocks that
Correspondence to: maurizio.iacopetta@sciencespo.fr. I would like to thank Nobuyuki Hanaki for helpful
suggestions. All errors are mine.
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a¤ect the intensity of communication among individuals, as this is measured by a matching
rate. Second, because the population is heterogenous with respect to rental income, it is
possible to evaluate how the societys stratication a¤ects its ability to reap the benets of
a communication shock.
The notion that a large gap between privileged and unprivileged individuals can slow
economic progress has been widely discussed in the literature. Landes (1998), for instance,
contends that people in Europe did not exhibit the same dynamism as the North American
settlers because the presence of a wealthy landed aristocracy in Europe abetted inaction.
By contrast, in America, Equality bred self-esteem, ambition, a readiness to enter and
compete in the marketplace, a spirit of individualism and contentiousness" (1998, p. 297).
Lopez, in a seminal summary of the medieval European commercial revolution, recounts the
circumstances of the rise of Italian cities as follows:
The business fever, when it came, left almost no one untouched. Perhaps the most telling
change occurred among those noble families that grew too large to live comfortably o¤ their
inherited land. Outside Italy the supernumerary children tried to escape poverty and boredom
through an ecclesiastic career, marriage to a noble heiress, or military service at somebodys
hire. In the Italian towns they more often found the same opportunities and thrills by pooling
their capital in business ventures, which involved a chance of pick up along the way a ght with
pirates, brigands, unfriendly lords, and possibly Indels. ...Indeed it is usually di¢ cult, in the
scanty documents of the tenth and eleventh centuries, to tell apart merchants who had bought
real estates with the prots of trade, and were called "honorable" or "noble", from the noblemen
who had sold their estate, invested the proceed in trade, and married merchants daughters.
(1976, p. 66)
Conversely, France, where the stratication of society was particularly pronounced until
the Revolution (Chaussinand-Nogaret, 1985), missed the opportunity to rival the Genoese
and the Venetians during the medieval trade revolution and in 17th century could hardly
match the maritime commercial power of the Dutch Republic.
To formalize these arguments, I consider a KW economy consisting of three groups of
people with di¤erent privileges, measured by their ows of rents. An individuals only
choice is whether to engage in (indirect) trade. For people at the bottom of the privilege
distribution, namely commoners, trading is always the best option. Conversely, for those
at the top, identied as the higher nobility, it never is. Those individuals in the middle,
however, can go either way. They abandon the existing rent-seeking practices if the lure
of commercial activities is strong enough to compensate them for foregoing the comfort of
receiving a generous regular rent. When the middle group chooses to trade, a new trade
link is created and all groups trade at higher frequencies. The consequences of this network
externality e¤ect are illustrated by a quantitative experiment that captures the main stylized
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facts of a commercial revolution.
Despite the policy debate spurred by Baumol (1990) and Murphy et al. (1991) on how
to reduce unproductive occupations, formal analysis of why trade could be an e¤ective in-
strument in pursuing such an objective is lacking. A notable exception is Holmes et al.
(2001). In a growth model with vertical innovation, they evaluate the e¤ects of regulatory
entry restrictions imposed on out-of-state rms. Their analysis and the type of shock they
consider are, nevertheless, di¤erent than mine. I focus on a pre-industrial economy, in which
sudden booms in income are typically driven by trade (Lopez, 1976, p. 85-91), and use the
matching rate to capture the communication shock.
Another related work is Acemoglu (1995), who employs evidence on the medieval com-
mercial revolution to argue that the reward system is not exogenous as, for instance, Baumol
(1990) does but adjusts over time as people move from unproductive to productive occupa-
tions. A similar result emerges in my analysis: When the middle group switches to trade,
the rental over production income ratio of privileged individuals declines.
This paper also contributes to the literature on growth spurts as the result of qualitative
changes in the structure of the economy. Peretto (2015) highlights that an important condi-
tion for the onset of modern growth is market expansion. Similarly, Kelly (1997) notes that
market expansion was the main driver of medieval Chinese economic growth. In this paper,
a larger market, generated by an acceleration of the matching rate, leads, as in Kelly, to a
temporary growth spurt in the long run, the economy converges to a higher but constant
level of production.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section briey describes
the economic environment, illustrates the evolution of the distribution of inventories under
a given prole of strategies, and denes the best response functions of three types of repre-
sentative agents. The section that follows studies the dynamics of the system. Section (4)
proposes two quantitative experiments to illustrate the propagation mechanism of a shock
to the matching rate. Section (5) discusses key stylized facts of the medieval and Atlantic
trade revolutions and comments on the resistance of the French aristocracy to trade. Section
(6) addresses multiple steady states. Section (7) concludes.
2 The Model Economy
There are only minor di¤erences with respect to the decentralized economy described in KW:
Time is continuous; the ranking of returns across assets is allowed to change; and agents are
not necessarily equally distributed across types.1 The overall size of the population is N .
There are three types of innitely lived agents, measured by Ni, for i = 1; 2; 3. The fraction
1Lagos et al. (2016), section two, also presents a similar summary of the model.
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of each type is i = Ni=N . The type i agent
2 consumes only good i and can produce
only good i + 1 (mod. 3). Production occurs immediately after consumption. Agent is
instantaneous utility from consumption and the disutility of producing good i+1 (the terms
good, commodity, inventory, and asset will be used interchangeably) are denoted by Ui and
Di, respectively, and their di¤erence is ui = Ui   Di. Without loss of generality, I assume
that Di = 0 and Ui = 1, for all i. There is a capacity constraint: At each instant in time,
an individual can hold only one unit of asset i that o¤ers a return ri, measured in units of
utility. The discount rate is denoted by  > 0. A pair of agents is randomly and uniformly
chosen from the population to meet for a possible trade. After a pair is formed, the waiting
time for the next pair to be called is governed by a Poisson process with intensity . A
bilateral trade occurs if, and only if, it is mutually agreeable. Agent i always accepts good i
but never holds it because there is immediate consumption. Therefore, agent i always enters
the market with either one unit of good i+ 1 or one unit of good i+ 2.
The proportion of type-i agents that hold good j at time t is denoted by pi;j(t). Then,
the vector ~p(t) = fpi;j(t)g for i = 1; 2; 3 and j = 1; 2; 3 describes the state of the economy
at time t (henceforth, i and j go from 1 to 3). However, because pi;i(t) = 0,
pi;i+1(t) + pi;i+2(t) = i, (1)
for any t > 0, the state of the economy can be represented in a more parsimonious way by
p(t) = fp1;2(t); p2;3(t); p3;1(t)g. To simplify the notation, sometimes pi;i+1 becomes pi. An
individual i has only to decide whether to exchange his production good for the other type
of good. Agent is choice in favor of indirect trade is denoted  i(t) = 1 and that against it
 i(t) = 0. Agent i has to select a time path,  i(t), that maximizes her expected stream of
present and future net utility, given other agentsstrategy paths, (t) = [1(t), 2(t), 3(t)],
and p(t), for any t > 0.
2.1 Distribution of Assets and Value Functions
For a given prole of strategies (t), the evolution in the stock of good i+ 1 held by agents
of type i is given by3
_pi;i+1 = fpi;i+2[pi+1;i(1  i+1) + pi+2;i + pi+2;i+1(1  i)]  pi;i+1[pi+1;i+2i]g: (2)
The terms inside the brackets before the minus sign calculate the probability that a type-i
agent is called for a match while holding good i + 2 and ultimately holds good i + 1. Such
2When no confusion arises, I will use the loose language of calling an agent of type i simply agent or
individual i.
3Du¢ e and Sun (2012) show that in a similar matching environment frequency coincides with probability.
See, in particular, their Theorem 1.
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an event materializes either because of barter or because the agent leaves the meeting with
good i; consumes it, and then immediately produces good i + 1. The following expression
accounts for the probability that an agent of type i who holds good i + 1 ultimately has
good i + 2. The behavior of pi;i+2 is derived through (1). The ensemble of the system that
describes the evolution of the distribution of inventories is denoted by F (p(t)).
Consider now a representative agent of type i that has to compute her best prole of
strategies, given a pattern of inventories, p(t), and a pattern of strategies for other agents,
(t) including those of her own type. Let Vi;j(t) be the value function when holding good
j at time t. When j = i+ 1, we have that
Vi;i+1(t) = maxf i(s)gst
Z 1
t
e (s t)fe (s t)([pi;i+2 i(1  i) + pi+1;i+2 i]Vi;i+2+ (3)
+ [1  pi;i+2 i(1  i)  pi+1;i+2 i]Vi;i+1 + [pi+1;i + pi+2;ii+2]ui)+
+
1  e (s t)

ri+1gds;
where the term e (s t)ds measures the probability that an agent of type i is called to form
a match for the rst time after time t in the time interval (s; s + ds). The term after the
discount factor is the probability that this agent engages in indirect trading in which case,
she is left with Vi;i+2 as her continuation value. Otherwise, she ultimately has good i + 1
either because no trade occurs or because she acquired her consumption good an event
that occurs with probability pi+1;i+ pi+2;ii+2 and then produces good i+1. The last term
is the return on holding asset i+1 from time t to time s. An additional equation for Vi;i+2(t),
reported in the Appendix, completes the description of the optimization problem.
Let i(s)  Vi;i+1(s)   Vi;i+2(s), and let ~ i(s;(s);p(s)) denote the optimal (or best)
response prole of strategies of representative agent i to other playersstrategies (s) along
the pattern of inventories p(s) for s > t. Then, it must be that
~ i(s;(s);p(s)) =
(
1 if i(s) < 0
0 otherwise.
(4)
for any s  t. Hence, the formulation of the problem corresponds to a Markov decision
process in which the representative agent optimizes over a sequence of functions, ~ i(t), that
allows the ex post decision on indirect trading to vary with the current state of the inventory
distribution and the pattern of the strategies of other agents.
2.2 Denition of Dynamic Nash Equilibrium
Given an initial distribution of inventories, p(0) = p0, a Dynamic Nash Equilibrium (DNE)
is a path of strategies (t) together with a distribution of inventories p(t) such that for all
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t > 0:
i. p(t) and (t) satisfy the dynamics equations (2) with the initial condition p(0) = p0
and subject to the constraint (1);
ii. For all t > 0, every agent maximizes his or her expected utility given the strategy
proles of the rest of the population; and
iii ~ i(t;
(t);p(t)) = i (t) for all t > 0.
2.3 Rent Seeking and Production
Following Lagos et al. (2016), I interpret a good as a Lucas tree producing a fruit. Let Qi
and Ri be the level of production and the rental income of the ensemble of type-i agents. It
is easy to show that
Qi = fpi;i+1(pi+1;i + pi+2;ii+2) + pi;i+2[pi+1;i(1  i+1) + pi+2;i]g. (5)
and that
Ri = (ri+1   ri+2)pi;i+1 + ri+2i, (6)
Therefore, the overall income of the ensemble of type-i agents is
Yi = Qi +Ri
Summing up over the three types of agents, we obtain the aggregate level of rent, production,
and income, that is: R =
P3
1Ri, Q =
P3
1Qi, and Y =
P3
1 Yi, respectively. The rental ratio,
ri, is dened as
~ri  Ri
Yi
=
1
1 +Qi=Ri
Hence, the rental ratio for the overall economy is
~r  R
Y
=
1
1 +Q=R
. (7)
A rst insight from equation (5) is that the ow of production of group i, Qi, depends on
the trade strategies of the other two groups of agents, i+1 and i+2. A second insight is that
the set of strategies of the three types of agents a¤ects Qi through the distribution of assets,
p. Section (2.5) analytically characterizes the dependence of production from the strategies
for some interesting equilibria.
Finally, it is also useful to dene the frequency of trade, ti(s). This measures the number
of times that a good is traded within a unit of time. It can be shown that
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ti(s) = fpi+2(i   pi(1  i+2) + i+1pi+1) + (i+1   pi+1)[pi+
(i   pi)(1  i+1) + (i+2   pi+2)(1  i+2)]g:
Then, the average trade frequency is
t(s) = x1(s)t1(s) + x2(s)t2(s) + x3(s)t3(s)
where xi(s) =
3X
j=1
pj;i, is the outstanding stock of the type-i good.
2.4 Privileges
I turn now to the description of economic privileges in an environment similar to Model A
of KW in which r3 < r2 < r1. Because ui = 1 for i = 1; 2; 3; the order of privileges can
be dened through the returns, ri. An agent i benets from two types of advantages when
his production good fetches a higher return, ri+1: he receives a greater ow of dividends
while waiting for a successful trade; he can market his production good more easily, as this
becomes more attractive for the buyer. Clearly, the most privileged individuals are type-3
agents, as they produce the good that yields the highest rent. Next come type-1 agents.
Type-2 agents, who produce the good with the lowest return, are at the bottom. A variety
of circumstances lead to the creation of rents (Baumol, 1990 and MSV). Here, however, I
am concerned with their consequences for production. Baumol remarks, "If the rules are
such as to impede the earning of much wealth via activity A, or are such as to impose social
disgrace on those who engage in it, then, other things being equal, entrepreneurse¤orts will
tend to be channeled to other activities, call them B. But if B contributes less to production
or welfare than A, the consequences for society may be considerable" (1990, p. 898). Next,
I characterize this statement in the KW environment.
2.5 Steady States
There are six possible return rankings. When r3 < r2 < r1 (Model A in KW), the steady-
state (pure-strategies) equilibrium is given by
 = [0; 1; 0] and p =
1
3
[1; 0:5; 1]; if
r2   r3

>
1
6
(F)
and by
 = [1; 1; 0] and p =
1
3
[a; b; 1]; if
r2   r3

<
1
3
(
p
2  1) (S)
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where a = 1
2
p
2 and b =
p
2   1. Following KW, I will refer to these two equilibria as
fundamental and speculative equilibrium, respectively, or as (0,1,0) and (1,1,0) equilibrium.
Two other rankings, r2 < r1 < r3 and r1 < r3 < r2, are simply relabeled depictions of
the same Model A-type economy. The three remaining rankings are more than relabeling
exercises, as they can give rise to multiple equilibria. They correspond to Model B of KW
and will be discussed in Section (6). Until then, I will focus on the case in which r3 < r2 < r1.
(Table 8 summarizes the main features of the equilibria under the six possible congurations
of the asset returns).
Returning now to the r3 < r2 < r1 case, I compare the volume of production and the
level of rents that prevail in the speculative and the fundamental equilibrium. The objective
is to obtain the main insight into the long-run e¤ects of communication shocks when this
induces type-1 individuals to switch strategies.
Proposition 1 Assume that r3 < r2 < r1,  satises the condition in (F) and that 0
satises the condition in (S) namely, 0 > r2 r31
3
(
p
2 1) . The equilibrium steady-state volumes
of production and the levels of rents when the matching rate is  and 0 are those reported
in Table 1.
Proof. To obtain the results in Table 1, it su¢ ces to evaluate the expressions (5) and (6)
on the fundamental (F) and speculative (S) equilibria.
An inspection of Panel A of Table 1 reveals the following:
Corollary 1 The volume of production, Qi and Q, is strictly higher in the speculative than
in the fundamental equilibrium.
A comparison of the level of rents (Panel B) obtained by groups over the two equilibria
yields the following result:
Corollary 2 The rents gained by type-3 individuals, R3, are the same in the two equilib-
ria. The rent earned by type-1 individuals, R1, is higher in the fundamental equilibrium.
Conversely, type-2 individuals receive higher rents, R2, in the speculative equilibrium.
This result implies that there would be a convergence of rents between the bottom and
the middle groups (i.e., commoners and lower nobility) when going from the fundamental to
the speculative equilibrium. From the two corollaries, the following also holds:
Corollary 3 The rental ratios of the two most privileged groups, ~r1 and ~r3, are always lower
in the speculative than in the fundamental equilibrium.
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Table 1: Production and Rents
Lower Nobility Commoners Higher Nobility Aggregate
Panel A: Production
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q
F 1
18
 1
18
 1
18
 1
6

S 2
p
2
18
(
p
2  1)0
p
2
18
0
p
2
18
0 2
9
0
Panel B: Rents
R1 R2 R3 R
F 1
3
r2
1
3
(1
2
r1 +
1
2
r3)
1
3
r1
1
2
r1 +
1
3
(r2 +
1
2
r3)
S 1
3
[ar2 + (1  a)r3] 13 [(1  b)r1 + br3] 13r1 (1 
p
2
3
)r1 +
1
3
p
2
(r2 + r3)
- Note: F and S denote the fundamental and speculative equilibrium, respectively; a = 1
2
p
2 and
b =
p
2  1.
A nal observation concerns the relationship among the average levels of rents, Ri, in the
two equilibria. Section (2.4) dened the privileges of an individual on the basis of the rent
generated by his production good relative to that of the other two goods. Panel B of Table 1
shows that in the fundamental equilibrium, the average rent of the higher nobility is greater
than that of the lower nobility and that the lower nobility earns a larger rent than do the
commoners. In the speculative equilibrium, it remains true that the higher nobility receives
a larger rent than the other two groups. Nevertheless, for the lower nobilitys average rent
to be larger than that of the commoners, r1  r2 relative to r2  r3 has to be below a certain
threshold. These observations are summarized as follows:
Corollary 4 In the fundamental steady-state equilibrium, R3 > R1 > R2. In the speculative
equilibrium, R3 > R1 and R3 > R2. Furthermore, if r1 r2r2 r3 <
1
(
p
2 1)2   1 ' 0:2071, R1 > R2.
Next, I describe the adjustment process of the economy when going from a fundamental
to a speculative equilibrium. First, I study the dynamics and establish some convergence
properties and then propose two experiments. In one, a shock to the matching parameter
triggers a switch from a fundamental to a speculative equilibrium, whereas it does not in the
other.
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3 Dynamics
KW provide a characterization of the steady-state equilibrium properties of their model
but do not attempt to describe the process by which the economy converges to a steady-
state equilibrium, nor do they o¤er an account of how a new trading strategy may emerge
during the transition. Several researchers have contributed to lling this gap via di¤erent
methodological approaches. Marimon et al. (1990) and Bas¸ç¬(1999) ask whether articially
intelligent agents can learn to play equilibrium strategies. A similar question is tested in
a number of controlled laboratory experiments with real people (Brown, 1996, and Du¤y
and Ochs, 1999). Matsuyama et al. (1993), Wright (1995), Luo (1999) and Sethi (1999)
approach the issue through evolutionary dynamics.
The dynamics of this class of models pose di¢ culties not encountered in economies in
which similar individuals trade their goods and services in centralized markets because the
evolution of the distribution of goods across individuals depends on the history of exchanges,
that is, on agentstrading strategies. These, in turn, are a¤ected by the expected evolution
of the distribution of goods.
I obtain the dynamics by building directly on the concept of an open-loop Nash equi-
librium with many players as in Fudenberg and Levine (1988). The idea is to identify an
equilibrium such that, given the actions of all other players, no player can make any gain by
changing her action. The analysis in this section is does not require any specic ordering of
the rents.
The law of motion of p(t) is a function of the prole of strategies, (t), that can change
over time in discrete steps. Specically, Eq. (2) states that the system of the distribution of
assets is given by the following (the time index is dropped):
_p1;2 = fp1;3[p2;1(1  2) + p3;1 + p3;2(1  1)]  p1;2p2;31g; (8)
_p2;3 = fp2;1[p3;2(1  3) + p1;2 + p1;3(1  2)]  p2;3p3;12g; (9)
_p3;1 = fp3;2[p1;3(1  1) + p2;3 + p2;1(1  3)]  p3;1p1;23g: (10)
The evolution of the system can be followed for any arbitrary pattern of strategies, (t),
and for any set of parameters. Nevertheless, to maintain analytical tractability, I restrict
attention to a time-constant set of strategies.
Proposition 2 Except for the set of strategies (1,1,1), under any other time-constant pure
strategies ( 1, 2, 3), with  i = f0; 1g, for i = 1; 2; 3, p(t) converges to a stationary distribu-
tion, from any initial position.
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Proof. See Appendix
This proposition guarantees global convergence of the system for seven of the eight pos-
sible sets of strategies. These, however, are not necessarily Nash strategies. The following
proposition species the paths that lead to a Nash steady-state equilibrium.
Proposition 3 When the population is equally divided among the three types, the following
six steady-state Nash Equilibria (NE) exist:
Strategies Assets Distribution Strategies Assets Distribution
(0,1,0) 1
3
[1; 1
2
; 1] (1,1,0) 1
3
[a; b; 1]
(1,0,0) 1
3
[1
2
; 1; 1] (1,0,1) 1
3
[b; 1; a]
(0,0,1) 1
3
[1; 1; 1
2
] (0,1,1) 1
3
[1; a; b]
where a = 1
2
p
2 and b =
p
2  1. In some cases a pair of NE coexist.
Proof. To prove that a given steady-state distribution is a NE, one needs to verify
that the sign of i is consistent with the prole of strategies assumed for that particular
steady-state distribution. See Technical Appendix for details.
Note that the (1,1,1) set of strategies, for which it is more di¢ cult to analytically establish
the convergence of the distribution, p(t), does not support a steady-state Nash equilibrium.
When the economy is outside of the steady state, the same principle of verifying the consis-
tency ofi with respect to  i applies. Nevertheless, obtaining an analytical solution is rather
challenging, as doing so depends on the overall forecasted evolution of the asset distribution.
Instead, I solve it through a numerical algorithm. Next, I briey illustrate the working of the
algorithm. (Further details are available in a technical appendix.) The algorithm is quite
general, as it also permits changing strategies along the dynamics.
The value functions, Vi;j, are the criteria that agents follow to determine their optimal
patterns of strategies. In a steady state, Vi;j can be determined analytically. To obtain their
values also outside of the steady state, I exploit two properties of the system. First, for
any interesting prole of strategies, the state variable, p(t), converges toward a xed point
(which is not necessarily a Nash equilibrium). Second, along a given pattern of p(t), the
numerical value functions converge to their theoretical values when integrated backward in
time. It is then possible to verify whether the value function of a representative agent along
a specic trajectory, p(t), is consistent with the prole of strategies that are used to obtain
such a trajectory, p(t), that is, to verify that no agent has an incentive to deviate at any
point in time from the designated prole of strategies. The algorithm generates a sequence of
rounds that seeks convergence toward an open-loop Nash equilibrium for p(t) and (t). To
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prove that a given steady-state distribution is a NE, one needs to verify that the sign of i is
consistent with the prole of strategies assumed for that particular steady-state distribution.
4 Quantitative Experiments
I now turn to a quantitative illustration of the central result of this paper: a communication
shock fuels an economic boom by inducing type-1 individuals, who are in the middle of the
privilege distribution, to switch from fundamental to speculative strategies, as long as the
distance between the privileged and unprivileged individuals is not too large.
4.1 The Commercial Revolution
Consider an economy characterized by a set of parameters that satises the condition for
a fundamental steady-state equilibrium (0,1,0), that is, r2 r3

> 1
6
, as, for example, that
reported in Table 2. The economy is in such an equilibrium when it is struck by a com-
munication shock. The magnitude of the shock is large enough that with the new level
of the matching rate, 0, the condition for a speculative steady state is veried, that is,
r2 r3
0 <
1
3
(
p
2   1). This shock captures, for instance, the initiatives of the Italian seaport
cities that broke the trade freeze in the Mediterranean (see section 5.1) or the Colombian
voyages.
After the shock, the three types of agents adopt the (1,1,0) constant prole of Nash
strategies, and the economy converges to the speculative steady state, p = 1
3
[a; b; 1], with
a = 1
2
p
2 and b =
p
2  1. The convergence is guaranteed by proposition (3). Fig. 1 depicts
the evolution of the distribution of assets and that of the trade frequencies for the three
goods. Type-1 individuals, by switching from  1 = 0 to  1 = 1, that is, by abandoning
rent-seeking behavior in favor of trade, fuel a boom in trade and production for all goods.
Specically, immediately after the shock, the trade frequency of good 2 and of good 3 more
than doubles, and that of good 1 increases by approximately 40%. Subsequently, the trade
frequency of good 1 continues increasing, that of good 2 declines, and that of good 3 exhibits
hump-shaped behavior. However, once the adjustment process to the new (speculative)
equilibrium is complete, all goods trade at higher frequencies than in the initial (fundamental)
equilibrium.
The long-run consequences of the shock on income and rental ratios were described in
the corollaries of section (2.5) (notice that the parameters satisfy the condition of corollary
4). The rst row (baseline) of Table 3 and of Table 4 summarize the long-run e¤ects of the
experiment, and Fig. 2 provides details on the adjustment process. In the short run, type-2
individuals (commoners) benet the most from the shock, as they are favored by the sudden
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Table 2: Parameters
Population Discount Matching Utility Returns
i   ui r1 r2 r3
Baseline 1
3
0.03 1 1 0.21 0.2 0
Higher Privileges 1
3
0.03 1 1 0.31 0.3 0
Table 3: Income Changes Long Run
Lower Nobility Commoners Higher Nobility Aggregate
Y1 Y2 Y3 Y
Baseline 30.01 56.20 40.29 41.37
Higher Privileges 16.43 23.04 16.11 18.03
- Note: The table reports the steady-state e¤ects of a 50% increase in  on Type-i average income
and on population-level average income. The underlying parameters of the two economies are
specied in Table 2. The gures are in percentages.
increase in the market for their production good 3. Indeed, immediately after the shock, the
market e¤ect is so large that type-2 individuals (commoners) overtake type-1 individuals 
the lower nobility. Although in the long run they remain at the bottom of the scale, the
distance from the lower nobility is considerably reduced. Such a convergence in income is
consistent with Lopezs observation, reported in the Introduction (see also Section 5.2), that
the commercial revolution blurred the dividing line between merchants and nobles.
Corollary 3 established that the communication shock always drives down the rental
rental ratios of the two privileged groups. With the current set of parameters, the commoners
rental ratio, ~r3, also declines. After an initial decline across the three types, the rental ratio,
~ri, continues declining for type-1 and type-3 individuals but increases for type-2 individuals
(Panel B of Fig. 1), chiey because the trade frequency of their consumption good declines.
Table 4: Changes in Rent-Income Ratios Long Run
Lower Nobility Commoners Higher Nobility Aggregate
~r1 ~r2 ~r3 ~r
Baseline -64.66 -40.37 -40.29 -49.57
Higher Privileges -16.43 -23.04 -16.11 -18.03
- Note: The table reports the steady-state e¤ects of a 50% increase in  on ~ri and ~r. The underlying
parameters of the two economies are specied in Table 2. The gures are in percentages.
13
Figure 1: The Commercial Revolution, Distribution of Goods, and Trade
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- Note: The baseline economy (see Table 2, rst row) is in the fundamental steady-state equilibrium
when it is struck by a shock that permanently increases the matching parameter by 50 percent. The
ratios and di¤erences are calculated with respect to the pre-shock state. The average frequency of
trade increases by approximately 70%.
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Figure 2: Communication Shock
Panel A: Income
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Panel B: Rent-Income Ratio
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- Note: Panel A plots the average income of type-3 (higher nobility), type-2 (lower nobility), and
type-1 (merchants) agents before and after a shock that increases the matching rate by 50 percent.
Initially, the economy is in a fundamental-steady state equilibrium. Panel B reports the percentage
change in the rent-output ratio ~ri and ~r (see Eqs. (6 and (7)) due to the shock. The parameter
values are in Table 3, rst row (baseline).
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Figure 3: Communication Shock
Panel A: Income
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- Note: See the note for gure 2. The underlying values of the parameters are in Table 3, second
row (higher privileges).
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4.2 Missing the Commercial Revolution
The passage from Lopez quoted in the Introduction notes that outside Italy, people were less
eager to reap the gains of the 13th century commercial revolution. The analysis suggests
that one factor that could have impeded the spread of the benets of commerce was the
relatively high levels of rents enjoyed by the nobility. As will be claried in Section (5.2), in
France and in Saxony, during the Middle Ages, the economic gap between the aristocracy
and commoners was substantially larger than in Northern Italy (Lopez, 1976, Wickham,
2009).
In the KW environment, a larger gap between the privileged and the less privileged
groups reduces the odds that a communication shock generates an economic boom. Recall
that when r2 r3

> 1
6
, the economys long-run equilibrium is (0,1,0). Hence, if the di¤erence
between the rent fetched by goods 2 and 3, which are produced by the lower nobility and
the commoners, respectively, is large, a shock to the matching parameter, , may fail to
convince the lower nobility to adopt a speculative strategy. This event is reproduced in Fig.
3, which depicts the e¤ects of a 50% increase in the matching rate in an economy similar
to that studied in the previous experiment, except that the goods produced by the two
privileged classes o¤er more generous returns (r1 = 0:31 and r2 = 0:3, see Table 2). The
higher matching rate makes everyone better o¤, but it fails to trigger the economic boom
observed in the previous experiment. Indeed, the economy remains in the same pre-shock
fundamental steady-state equilibrium, although the trading and production activities are
scaled up because of the higher meeting frequency. In the current experiment, in the long-
run average income increases by 18 percent, compared to a 41 percent rise in the baseline
experiment (Table 3) and the average rent-income ratio declines by approximately 18% (all
driven by the rise in production income), while in the baseline experiment, it declines by
approximately 50% Table 4.
5 Discussion
In this section, I verify the plausibility of the central results of the model by reviewing histori-
cal evidence on the e¤ects of a communication shock. The baseline experiment demonstrated
that if the gap between the privileged classes and the commoners is not too large, an im-
provement in communication favors (1) the emergence of a commercial nobility; (2) the
convergence of income between commoners and the commercial nobility; and (3) a substan-
tial increase in per capita income. Conversely, the alternative experiment revealed that if the
rental gap, r2   r3, is relatively large, the nobility will resist trade, the social and economic
gap will persist, and per capita income will increase only moderately, reecting the more
intensive frequency of existing patterns of trade.
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To match the phenomena emerging in the two experiments, I will review key facts con-
cerning the onset and dissemination of the 13th commercial revolution and regarding the
consequences of Atlantic trade in France and the Netherlands. I will also discuss evidence
that leads support for the notion that the landed aristocracys resistance to trade prevented
France from experiencing an economic boom comparable to that observed in Northern and
Central Italy during the Middle Ages and in the Low Countries during the 16th century.
5.1 The Middle Age Communication Shock
With the disintegration of the Roman Empire, the regions on the shores of the Mediterranean
broke their communication ties. In the period running from approximately the year 700 to
950, trade had reached a low point in Europe, with the exception of those regions under the
economic inuence of the Arabs and of Byzantium, most notably Spain and Sicily.
"[B]y the time of Charlemagne the sea that had functioned as a central highway for the Greco-
Roman community became the border between three di¤erent communities, which in the lack
of an appropriate economic term may be identied through their predominant religions: Islamic,
Orthodox, and Catholic. (Lopez, 1976, p. 22)
A tenuous link between these three separate communities was initially provided by the
Jews. Their success in trade, however, was often halted by the reaction of the majority of
the population that would drive them out of the community and force them to forfeit their
capital (Lopez 1976, p. 62). The positive and lasting shock that signicantly improved the
communication networks in the Mediterranean was due to the actions of small, poor com-
munities such as the one that took refuge on the Venetian islands. With the rise of Italian
seaport cities, the Mediterranean again became a commercial highway. Cipolla (1974) cites
the rapid spread of the Black Death as evidence of the intensication of the communication
network in Europe and in the Mediterranean, an hypothesis subsequently supported by sev-
eral studies in economic history, demography, and epidemiology (see Boerner and Severgnini,
2012).
The communication shock was not the result of a policy of a centralized government as in
Sung China (Kelly, 1997). Quite the contrary, it occurred in the most politically fragmented
part of Europe. Lopez states the following:
Venice was then [829] practically independent, but honored her allegiance to Byzantium by
supplying naval assistance, and used her eastern connections to unlock the gates of the Western
Empire. She also maintained with Muslim Africa and the Levant as good relations as the sudden
transitions from cold to hot war permitted. Thus she gradually built up a thriving triangular
trade. (1976, p. 63)
The new fervor for commerce was also not associated with any major developments in
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naval engineering. The most common Venetian vessel was an improved version of the Roman
and later Byzantine galley. Venetian trade was conducted primarily through short-haul
navigation with relatively small galleys.
5.2 Privileges: The Italian Commercial Nobility and the French
Aristocracy
In the baseline experiment, the communication shock triggered a major transformation of
the model economy. Type-1 individuals (the lower nobility) abandoned rent-seeking activity
and turned to trade. As a result, the income of the type-1 and type-2 individuals (the
commoners) converged toward a higher level (see Panel A, Figure (2)).
It has been said that the presence of the king with his power to distribute privileges
absorbed the attention of the most resourceful in a society (Baumol, 2002). This appears to
have been the case in France (Acemoglu et al., 2005). Conversely, as the Venetian nobility
was too distant from Constantinople and in conict with the Frankish and German kings,
it did not develop any expectations of earning substantial rents from traditional lordships.
It is revealing, for instance, that the Venetian nobility was not determined by land but by
wealth accumulated through commercial activities (Madden, 2012). On this subject, Lopez
reports the following:
As the progress of Venice and Amal was shifting the center of economic and naval power
from the Byzantine and Muslim to the Catholic shore of the Mediterranean, two seaports from
the barbarian part of Italy joined the race. Pisa and Genoa, too, were driven into a predominately
commercial way of life by an original handicap. In the tenth century their territory had been
frequently laid waste by Muslim raiders looking for slaves and other booty; not even the towns
had been spared. Led by their urban nobility, the Pisans and the Genoese fought back. (1976,
p. 66)
Puga and Treer (2014) also document high social mobility and low income inequality
in Venice through the end of the 13th century, that is, until the establishment of entry
restrictions into the lucrative long-distance trade (the Serrata). Similarly, in Genoa, the
dividing line between nobles and merchants was rather blurred. Lopez o¤ers the following
account:
The habit of sharing risk on the decks of the ships and rubbing shoulders in the narrow alleys
and shops of the business center created a strong equalitarian tradition. Ever since the origins of
the Genoese Commune, the law admitted no privileges of birth and ignored the very word "nobil-
ity." Naturally, this does not mean that nobility was unknown, for aristocrats turned businessmen
played leading roles in town and at sea; but the rst recognition it got was through fourteenth-
century decrees that excluded noblemen from public o¢ ces. The informal term bonitas, good or
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solid citizens, described the Genoese upper class more accurately. (1964, p. 447- 48)
The second experiment claried that the switch to a speculative strategy does not occur
(see Figure (3)) when the upper classesrents are above a certain threshold. Medieval France
was a region dominated by a rich landed aristocracy. "Aristocracy varied substantially in
their wealth across western societies. In Merovingian Francia, there were some really rich
landowners, with dozens of landed estates each, and a highly militarized factional politics.
Bavaria was like Francia, although probably on a smaller scale; only a handful of families
(apart from the ruling dukes) seem to have been important owners. In Lombard Italy,
however, the wealth of the aristocratic strata was much more modest" (Wickham,2009, pp.
204-205).
More specically on the situation of the aristocracy in Northern Italy, Wickham states,
"Most Lombard aristocrats were fairly restricted in their wealth. Almost none of our doc-
uments show any of them with more than between ve and ten estates, which is close to a
minimum for aristocrats in Francia. The king and the ruling dukes of the south [Italy] had
immense lands, of course, and a small number of powerful ducal families, particularly the
north-east were rich, but the bulk of the elite owned only a handful of properties, usually
only in the city territory they lived in, plus perhaps its immediate neighbors, with, quite
often, a house in Pavia" (2009, pp.145-146).
The accumulation of conspicuous wealth by the French landed aristocracy continued dur-
ing the Carolingian and post-Carolingian periods, when more land came under aristocratic
control than before and less land was under the control of non-aristocrats. This change was
particularly evident in Saxony, where Charlemagnes conquest resulted in a rapid takeover
of land that had previously been under peasant ownership (Wickham, 2009)
5.3 The Middle Ages Growth Spurt
In the baseline experiment, there is a more pronounced acceleration of trade (70%) than
in the alternative high-rent scenario (40%) because the communication shock triggered the
emergence of a new trade link. As a result, in the baseline experiment, income also increased
substantially more (41%) than in the high-rent scenario (18%) (see Tables 3 and 4).
Some data, admittedly of a rather rough variety, are available to verify the responses of
trade and income to a communication shock in places that di¤ered in the level of privilege
enjoyed by the upper classes. Table 5 reports the impressive population growth in Genoa
and Venice, the two Italian cities that were at the core of the commercial revolution. Bairoch
(1988) estimates that the population in Venice went from approximately 45 thousand in the
year 1000 to 75 thousand in the year 1200 and reached a medieval peak of 110 thousand
in the year 1300. The population explosion in Genoa is even more staggering. The corre-
sponding gures are 15, 30, and 100 thousand, respectively. Bairochs data concord with
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Lopezs remark that "by the end of the thirteenth century, Genoa proper may have reached
the 100,000 mark, with probably another half million people in the territory of the state,
which included several smaller urban centers. These gures are no more than very rough
approximations, but they would indicate that the capital city was the fth largest in Eu-
rope (larger than Paris and London, but smaller than Constantinople, Venice, Milan, and
Florence) and the entire state was more thickly settled than Pennsylvania today" (1964, p.
448).
In contrast, during the 13th century, the population of Marseille increased only moder-
ately and even declined in the following century: In the year 1200, Marseille was approxi-
mately the same size of Genoa, but by the year 1400, it had a population of only one-fth
that of Genoa or Venice.
The dynamism of northern Italian cities engaging in maritime trade is associated with an
increase in income. Angus Maddisons (2009) data indicate that between the year 1000 and
1500, per capita income more than doubled in Italy. Furthermore, Bold and van Zandens
(2014) data indicate that in the year 1500, income in Northern Italy was 40 percent higher
than Italys average reported by Maddison (2009).
The use of the GDP per capita statistics in contemporary prices for earlier centuries
inevitably relies on strong assumptions. Nevertheless, they agree with Lopezs description of
the 13th century economic situation in Northern and Central Italy: "[N]ever before had such
a large proportion of the population been free from want, or such a variety and abundance
of goods been constantly available not in ancient Rome at its peak, not in Byzantine and
Islamic countries at their best" (1976, p. 106).
5.4 Atlantic Trade
As observed in Section (4.2), despite France being in a favorable geographical position, it
did not benet from the trade revolutions as did the nearby Low Countries and Northern
Italy.
That pre-revolutionary France did not catch the Atlantic trade wave appears evident from
the modest change in population in its Atlantic seaport cities compared to that observed
in the Dutch Republic. In the year 1700, the population of Bordeaux, the most important
French 18th century port, was approximately equal to that of two centuries earlier and only
one-quarter that of Amsterdam. Furthermore, the share of French among the merchant
population of Bordeaux in the 18th century was rather small: Sephardi, Germans, Dutch
and Irish made up one-third of Bordeaux merchants, and half of the French rms were
operated by Huguenots linked to the Protestant merchants of Northern Europe. Only after
1793 was a new pattern of trade established in Bordeaux, most notably with the United
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States (Marzagalli, 2005).
By contrast, between 1600 and 1700, Amsterdam experienced explosive growth, growing
from 54 to 200 thousand inhabitants. Income also increased considerably in the Netherlands.
In the year 1500, per capita income in France and the Netherlands was approximately the
same. By the year 1600, however, income in the Netherlands was nearly double that observed
a century earlier, whereas in France it had increase by less than 20 percent. In the following
century, the divergence between the two regions became more pronounced, with a gap factor
of 2.3 in the year 1700 (see Table 7).
5.5 More on the Resistance of the French Aristocracy to Com-
merce
In the experiment in Section (4.2) the lower nobility did not switch to speculative strategies
because r2 r3 > 160, where 0 is the matching rate after the positive communication shock.
Clearly, the larger the gap, r3   r2, the higher the expected loss in terms of rent associated
with a switch to a speculative strategy.
A number of historians argue that the the landed French aristocracy was resistant to
embracing commerce due to concerns that such a move would cost them privileges especially
property tax exemptions. Such a belief was well grounded. In 1295, when Philip the Fair
exempted the nobles from paying him a certain aid, he specically excluded those in trade.
In 1435, Charles VII refused to exempt from taxation nobles who sold their wines in taverns.
Earlier in the 16th century, Francis I voided the tax exemptions of nobles who meddled in
commercial activities.
The position of the French monarchy with respect to having a commercial nobility was
ambiguous, as two conicting interests were at stake. On the one hand, the monarch had
a clear interest in developing trade, as this was an important source of revenue to nance
warfare. For instance, Lopez (1964) reports that at the end of the 13th century, the taxes
Genoa raised from her sea trade amounted to approximately ten times the receipts of the
French royal treasury. On the other hand, the king could not a¤ord to lose the support of
the nobility that had long opposed the idea of mingling with merchants.
It is revealing that Louis XI, who was very familiar with the state of a¤airs in the Italian
cities, took steps to establish commercial routes to compete with Venice and Genoa. In the
second half of the 15th century, the monarch prepared legislation to eliminate the separation
between the nobility and merchants, in imitation of what was already in place in Italian
cities. However, the law was never implemented. Instead, a few decades later, in 1560,
prior legislation and customs that sanctioned the nobilitys participation in commerce was
codied (the Code of Ordinances of Orleans, see Zeller, 1946). It was not until 1629, under
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Table 5: Population in French and Italian Seaport Cities (000)
Year 1000 1200 1300 1400
Venice 45 70 110 100
Genoa 15 30 100 100
Marseille 7 25 31 21
Bordeaux n.a. 15 30 30
- Source: Bairoch (1988)
Table 6: Population in French and Dutch Seaport Cities (000)
Year 1500 1600 1700
Amsterdam 15 54 200
Bordeaux 50 40 45
- Source: Bairoch (1988).
Richelieu, that nobles were allowed to engage in maritime commerce, either directly or by
proxy, without fear of loosing their status. Although some nobles seized opportunities in
overseas trade by participating in trading companies (Chaussinand-Nogaret, 1975), by the
middle of the 18th century, the debate among French intellectuals on whether to have a
commercial nobility remained lively. An example is the controversy stirred by the pamphlet
"Commercial Nobility" (La Noblesse Commerçante) that appeared in 1756. The author, who
was an inuential writer at that time, rebutted Montesquieus position, elaborated in The
Spirit of the Laws (1748, Book XX, Ch. 21), that opposed the idea of having a commercial
nobility (see Adam, 2003, and Grassby, 1960, for details on the controversy).
6 Multiple Equilibria
Thus far, I have considered economies with unique equilibria. It is well known that the
KW environment may generate multiple steady states. Any of the rankings in Panel B of
Table 8, which correspond to Model B of KW, may exhibit multiple steady states. Do these
congurations of parameters add insights on the arrival of the commercial revolution? The
short answer is no. In Model A, the commercial revolution was triggered by the emergence of
a new trade link that magnied the trade frequencies and caused an income boom. In Model
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Table 7: Average per Capita GDP in 1990 International GK Dollars
Year 1000 1500 1600 1700
Italy 450 1100 1100 1100
Italy (Center-North) n.a. 1533 1363 1476
Netherlands 425 751 1381 2105
France 473 727 841 910
- Source: The gures for Center-North Italy are from Bold and van Zanden (2014). The remaining
data are drawn from Maddison (2003).
Table 8: Steady State Equilibria, Strategies, and Money
Returns F S Assets (F) Assets (S)
Panel A
R1 r3 < r2 < r1 (0,1,0) (1,1,0) 13 [1;
1
2
; 1] 1
3
[a; b; 1]
R2 r2 < r1 < r3 (1,0,0) (1,0,1) 13 [
1
2
; 1; 1] 1
3
[b; 1; a]
R3 r1 < r3 < r2 (0,0,1) (0,1,1) 13 [1; 1;
1
2
] 1
3
[1; a; b]
Panel B
R4 r2 < r3 < r1 (1,1,0) (1,0,1) 13 [a; b; 1]
1
3
[b; 1; a]
R5 r3 < r1 < r2 (0,1,1) (1,1,0) 13 [1; a; b]
1
3
[a; b; 1]
R6 r1 < r2 < r3 (1,0,1) (0,1,1) 13 [b; 1; a]
1
3
[1; a; b]
- Note: a = 1
2
p
2 and b =
p
2   1. The F and S columns contain the triplet (1; 2;3) that
describes the fundamental and the speculative steady-state strategy, respectively. The two columns
that follow are the assetsstationary distributions: [p1;2; p2;3; p3;1]. In rows R1 through R3, the
equilibria are unique; only one type of agent plays speculative strategies in the S equilibrium. In
rows R4-R6, the two equilibria may coexist; two types of agents play speculative strategies in the
S equilibrium.
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B, however, it is not possible to generate the emergence of an expanded trade network when
going from a fundamental to a speculative steady-state equilibrium. Consider, for instance,
the case in which r3 < r1 < r2 (see R5, Panel B, Table 8). The higher nobility, lower
nobility, and commoners, now correspond to type-2, type-3, and type-1 agents, respectively.
A (0,1,1) steady-state equilibrium always exists. A (1,1,0) steady state exists (namely, type-
1 and type-3 agents adopt speculative behavior) if the following two conditions are satised
(a Technical Appendix details the derivations):
p
2  1
3
>
r2   r3

,
and
1p
2
p
2  1
3
>
r2   r1

.
Imagine that, initially,  is low such that at least one of the two above conditions is
violated. A positive shock to  can precipitate a (0,1,1) equilibrium, which would coexist
with the (1,1,0) equilibrium. Because there are multiple equilibria, agents can either main-
tain their current strategies or type-1 and type-3 agents will switch to speculative strategies.
(Expectations, not history, determine the outcome). Nevertheless, neither of the two out-
comes is able to capture the commercial revolution. Even if type-1 and type-3 agents react
to the communication shock by turning to speculative strategies (the numerical algorithm
suggests that this can occur under any reasonable discount rate), the frequency of aggregate
trade is hardly a¤ected. Indeed, in the fundamental equilibrium, one of the two upper classes
is already engaged in indirect trade. If agents coordinate on the (1,1,0) the two upper classes
simply switch strategies, with type-1 agents ipping from  1 = 0 to  1 = 1 and type-3 agents
from  3 = 1 to  3 = 0.
7 Concluding Remarks
I explored the idea that an improvement in communication and transportation can direct
a greater fraction of the population toward productive activities (Murphy et al., 1991) in
an environment in which the frequency of trade drives the dynamics of production and
consumption (Kiyotaki and Wright, 1998). The main result is that a communication shock is
more likely to benet a society when the gap between privileged and unprivileged individuals
is not too large. To verify the plausibility of the result, I considered two major communication
shocks: the medieval revival of the Mediterranean routes and the Colombian voyages. The
main implication of the exercise is consistent with the characterization of the societies at the
time of the two shocks. The commercial revolutions that followed the two communication
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shocks occurred in places where the inequality in the distribution of privileges was limited,
most notably in Northern Italy during the Middle Ages and in The Netherlands in the
16th and 17th centuries. In contrast, where society was highly stratied, as for example in
pre-revolutionary France, the reaction to either communication shock was weak.
This paper implies that di¤erences in the gains from trade across countries may reect
di¤erences in the distribution of privileges. It also suggests that when a government is
considering trade liberalization, it should rst smooth the distribution of privileges.
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Technical Appendix [Not intended for publication]
Distribution of Inventories (Proposition 2)
For a given prole of strategies, the system (8)-(10) converges globally to the unique
steady state reported in the following table:
Strategies Assets Distribution Strategies Assets Distribution
(0,1,0) [1;
21
3+1
; 3] (1,0,1) [p
#
1;2; 2; p
#
3;1]
(1,0,0) [ 13
2+3
; 2; 3] (0,1,1) [1; p
xo
2;3; p
xo
3;2]
(0,0,1) [1; 2;
13
1+2
] (0,0,0) [1; 2; 3]
(1,1,0) [p1;2; p

2;3; 3]
Case (0,1,0). Eq. (8) reduces to _p1;2 = p1;33, implying that the line p1;2 = 1 is
globally attractive (henceforth, g.a.). Similarly, because Eq. (10) _p3;1 = p3;2[p1;3 + 2],
p3;1 = 3 is g.a.. Finally, along these lines, the system collapses to
_p2;3 = (2   p2;3)1   p2;33;
which clearly converges globally to 21
3+1
. In brief, under the prole of strategies (0,1,0), the
distribution of inventories converges globally to the stationary distribution [1;
21
3+1
; 3].
Case (0,0,1) and Case (1,0,0). One can verify that the stationary distribution converges
to [1; 2;
13
1+2
] and [ 13
2+3
; 2; 3], respectively, using the same observations as in the pre-
vious case.
Case (1,1,0). Eq. (10) becomes _p3;1 = 2(3   p3;1). Consequently, 3 = p3;1 is an
invariant set. The Jacobian, J , of the system of the two remaining equations (8) and (9)
along the line 3 = p3;1 is
J = 
"
 (3 + p2;3)  p1;2
(2   p2;3)  (3 + p1;2)
#
:
The determinant is positive, and the trace is negative; therefore, both eigenvalues are nega-
tive, and the system is globally stable. To nd the stationary distribution, set (8) and (9)
to zero. They yield p1;2 = 13=(3 + p2;3) and p1;2 =
3
2=p2;3 1 , respectively. The two lines
necessarily cross once and only once for p2;3 in the interval [0,3]. The xed point is [p

1;2;
p2;3; 3], where p

2;3 =
1
2
[ (1 + 3) +
p
(1 + 3)
2 + 412] and p

1;2 =
13
3+p

2;3
.
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Cases (1,0,1) and (0,1,1). A Jacobian with similar properties can be obtained when
the proles of strategies are (1,0,1) or (0,1,1). The xed point with (1,0,1) is [p#1;2; 2; p
#
3;1],
where p#1;2 =
1
2
[ (3 + 2) +
p
(3 + 2)
2 + 431] and p
#
3;1 =
13
p#1;2+2
. Similarly, under
(0,1,1), the xed point is [1; p
xo
2;3; p
xo
3;2], where p
xo
3;1 =
1
2
[ (2 + 1) +
p
(2 + 1)
2 + 423]
and pxo2;3 =
12
pxo3;1+1
.
Case (0,0,0). The system converges globally p = [1,2,]. In this stationary state,
agents keep their production goods.
When the prole of strategies is (1,1,1), it is more di¢ cult to characterize the properties
of the Jacobian. This turns out not to be a Nash equilibrium, at least when the population
is equally split across types.
Eq. (3) describes Vi;i+1(t). The following does the same for Vi;i+2(t)
Vi;i+2(t) = maxf i(s)gst
Z 1
t
e (s t)fe (s t)([pi+1;i(1  i+1) + pi+2;i](Vi;i+1 + ui)+ (11)
[pi;i+1i + pi+2;i+1](1   i)Vi;i+1
[1  pi+1;i(1  i+1)  pi+2;i   (pi;i+1i + pi+2;i+1)(1   i)]Vi;i+2+
1  e (s t)

ri+2gds;
Taking derivatives of eqs. (3) and (11) with respect to time yields
_Vi;i+1 =  ([pi;i+2 i(1  i) + pi+1;i+2 i]Vi;i+2+ (12)
p+ [1  pi;i+2 i(1  i)  pi+1;i+2 i]Vi;i+1+
[pi+1;i + pi+2;ii+2]ui)  ri+1 + (+ )Vi;i+1(s);
_Vi;i+2 =  ([pi+1;i(1  i+1) + pi+2;i](Vi;i+1 + ui) + [pi;i+1i + pi+2;i+1](1   i)Vi;i+1
+ [pi;i+1i + pi+2;i+1](1   i)Vi;i+1+
+ [1  pi+1;i(1  i+1)  pi+2;i   (pi;i+1i + pi+2;i+1)(1   i)]Vi;i+2)+
  ri+2 + (+ )Vi;i+2;
respectively.
The last two expressions can also be written as
_Vi;i+1 =  ([pi;i+2 i(1  i) + pi+1;i+2 i]( i) + Vi;i+1+
[pi+1;i + pi+2;ii+2]ui)  ri+1 + (+ )Vi;i+1(s);
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_Vi;i+2 =  ([pi+1;i(1  i+1) + pi+2;i + [pi;i+1i + pi+2;i+1](1   i)]i + [pi+1;i(1  i+1) + pi+2;i]ui
+ Vi;i+2)  ri+2 + (+ )Vi;i+2;
Subtracting side-by-side, we obtain
_i =  ([pi;i+2 i(1  i) + pi+1;i+2 i + pi+1;i(1  i+1) + pi+2;i + (pi;i+1i + pi+2;i+1)(1   i)]( i)+
+i + [pi+1;ii+1   pi+2;i(1  i+2)]ui)  ri+1 + ri+2 + (+ )i
Let
i  pi;i+2 i(1  i) + pi+1;i+2 i + pi+1;i(1  i+1) + pi+2;i + (pi;i+1i + pi+2;i+1)(1   i)
where i  [pi;i+2 i(1  i) + pi+1;i+2 i]. Then the last two di¤erential equations reduce
to
_i =  ((1  i)i + [pi+1;ii+1   pi+2;i(1  i+2)]ui)  ri+1 + ri+2 + (+ )i; (13)
Because (+) > 0, for any given pattern of the asset distribution, the system is unstable.
The Technical Appendix explains how this equation is used to verify whether a stationary
distribution of assets is a Nash equilibrium.
Stationary Nash Equilibria (Proposition 3)
The stationary distribution of inventories is derived from (2) under the assumption that
1 = 2 = 3 =
1
3
. The key condition for determining whether a stationary distribution is a
NE is the sign of i. From (13), it follows that i > 0 if
pi+1;ii+1   pi+2;i(1  i+2) > ri+2   ri+1
ui
(14)
Consistency requires that i = 0 (1) with i > 0 (< 0). This section reviews the consistency
conditions (14) for the rankings listed in Table 8.
Model A ( r3 < r2 < r1). There are two unique NE: (0,1,0) and (1,1,0·). The (0,1,0)
equilibrium requires that
p2;1   p3;1 > r3   r2
u1
(15)
 p1;2 < r2   r1
u2
; (16)
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and
0 >
r2   r1
u3
; (17)
with p2;1 = 13   p2;3, p1;2 = 13 , p2;3 = 16 , and p3;1 = 13 . Conditions (16) and (17) are clearly
veried. From (15), it follows that the (0,1,0) equilibrium exists if 1
6
> r2 r3
u1
. For the (1,1,0)
equilibrium, the stationary distribution is p = 1
3
[a; b; 1]: The above three conditions are
replaced by
p2;1   p3;1 < r3   r2
u1
;
0 <
r1   r3
u2
;
and
p1;3 >
r2   r1
u3
;
respectively, with p2;1 = 13   p2;3, p1;2 = a3 , p2;3 = b6 , and p3;1 = 13 . Again, the last two
conditions are obviously satised. The rst condition says that in a NE, type-1 agents play
speculative if
  b
6
<
r3   r2
u1
.
There are no other NE.
A similar proof applies for the rankings R2 and R3 in Panel A of Table 8. I turn now to
rankings of Panel B of Table 8 that can give rise to multiple steady states.
Model B.One fundamental NE always exists. This could coexist with another equilibrium
in which two types of agents play speculative strategies (multiple equilibria).
When r3 < r1 < r2. The (0,1,1) is the fundamental NE. It exists for any set of parameters
(for which the value functions are non-negative). Under the following two conditions, the
(1,1,0) NE also exists:
p2;1   p3;1 < r3   r2
u1
p1;3 >
r2   r1
u3
with p2;1 = 13(1  b), p3;1 = 13 and p1;3 = 13(1  a). The top one requires   b3 > r3 r2u1 and
the bottom one that 1
3
(1  a) > r2 r1
u3
.
A similar reasoning applies to scenarios R5 and R6.
Algorithm
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The algorithm sets up an iteration on the prole of strategies, (t), and on the distribution
of assets, p(t). The value function, Vi;j(t), of the representative agents i holding good j serves
as device to update the guess on the prole of strategies and to determine when the algorithm
has converged. As only pure strategies are considered,4 a representative agent i has a binary
choice at each point in time. The algorithm seeks the convergence of representative agent is
best response, ~ i(t;(t);p0), to the prole followed by the other individuals of her type, i(t).
When the representative individual i does not have an interest in deviating from a strategy
that coincides with that followed by the rest of type-i agents, a Dynamic Nash Equilibrium
is found. The algorithm works as follows.
Step 1. The distribution of inventories, F (p(t)), is integrated forward in time beginning
from some p0, under a guess 
(0)(t). The integration is stopped at some time, T , that is
su¢ ciently large that jF (p(T ))j < 10 6. An obvious initial guess is (0)(t) = ss, where ss
is the steady-state Nash prole of strategies. (For some s > s with s su¢ ciently large, one
can expect that ~ i(s) = 
(0)
i (s) for s > s.) Let p
(0)(t) be the inventory solution under such
a guess.
Step 2. The algorithm computes the best response of a representative agent i on the
trajectory p(0)(t). His i is computed integrating (18) backward in time, beginning from the
initial condition (i(
ss;p(0)(T )), p(0)(T )).5 At the end of this step, one obtains a trajectory,
(0)(t), and more important, the corresponding best response ~ (0)i (t) of the representative
agent i.
Step 3. The consistency between (0)i (t) and ~
(0)
i (t) is veried. If these are di¤erent,
~
(0)
i (t) becomes the new guess on the next round, namely 
(1)
i (t) = ~
(0)
i (t), and the procedure
restarts from step one. The method allows the prole of strategies to change at any point
in time.
The iteration is repeated until convergence between (n+1)i (t) and ~
(n)
i (t) is achieved or
until a maximum number of iterations is reached. If the iteration converges to a xed point,
say p(t) and (t), then p(t) and (t) are the distribution of assets and the trading
strategies, respectively, of a Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium. The procedure veries that
at such a xed point, the value function of any agent is at its maximum value, given the
actions of the rest of the agents.
Forward and Backward Integration
This section examines the dynamic properties of the value functions of the representative
4Kehoe et al. (1993) build cyclical equilibria in a similar environment under sets of parameters that do
not admit pure strategy equilibria.
5i(
ss;pss) could also be used as the initial point. In principle, on i(
ss;pss), the system stays still,
but if computed numerically, there is always a small machine error that allows the integration to begin. In the
experiments, the di¤erence in norm between the two points is smaller than 10 5 when jF (p(t)j < 10 6.
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agent i. These properties are important because they will be used by the algorithm to verify
whether a particular distribution of assets and of strategies is an open-loop Nash equilibrium.
According to (4), what matters for representative is decision is only the sign of i. After
some algebra, one obtains,
_i = (i + )i + !i; (18)
where i  pi;i+2 i(1 i)+pi+1;i+2 i+pi+1;i(1 i+1)+pi+2;i+(pi;i+1i+pi+2;i+1)(1  i) > 0
and !i   [pi+1;ii+1   pi+2;i(1  i+2)]ui + (ri+2   ri+1).
For a given pattern of i, the solution of i can be obtained numerically by integrating
(18) backward in time,6 starting from a neighborhood of the steady state i , where this
satises (i + )

i + !i = 0.
It is important to recognize that the distribution of inventories, p(t), and the value
functions in di¤erences, i(t), could be studied jointly as a whole system. In particular, it
is possible to generate equilibrium trajectories by simply applying the principle of backward
induction as long as the populations prole of strategies is kept consistent with the sign of
i(t) at each point in time. The problem with this procedure is that it is di¢ cult to construct
a trajectory that goes through a designated point in the space of the asset distribution. In
models with a unidimensional state variable, backward induction works wellat least when
the dynamics are not cyclical or chaotic because it can be stopped when the state variable
reaches a desired level. However, as the dimension of the manifold expands, guiding the
system toward a particular point on the state space (that is, on the initial condition) becomes
a challenge. In fact, if the system has Liapunov exponents of a di¤erent order of magnitude,
some regions of the manifold cannot even be reached. Conversely, the method proposed here
o¤ers total control over the initial condition, a feature that turns out to be essential for most
interesting macroeconomic experiments.
The right plot of Fig. 4 illustrates a solution of (18) for i = 1 for a particular pattern of
1: This pattern is obtained by integrating forward in time (8)-(10), beginning from some
arbitrary initial p(0), under an exogenous prole of strategies.
Matlab Codes
All the programming is done in Matlab. The main running le, called dynamics_KW,
sets the parameters, species the initial distribution of inventories and the initial guess of
the strategies, launches the iteration solution procedure, and generates the plots. The iter-
ation procedure is based on the interaction between two les, triggered within the le dy-
namics_KW: backward_ode_kw89and forward_ode_kw89. The backwardle gives
instructions to integrate the distribution of inventories forward. The resulting distribution
6The mechanism is illustrated in a gure contained in the Technical Appendix.
35
Figure 4: Combining Forward and Backward Integration
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Note - For parameters see Table 2, with r2 = 0:1. The initial value of p1;2 is 60 percent of its
steady-state value. The slope of the right plot is 1(t) +  with ~ 1(t) = 0 and (t) = [0; 1; 0].
The path of p(t) in 1(t) is obtained by integrating the system (8)-(10) forward in time (left plot).
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of inventories (reversed with respect to time) is saved and used as an input for in the back-
wardle. This integrates the value functions using, as the initial condition, their steady
state values. The backwardle delivers the three value functions (in di¤erences) of the
representative agents i = 1; 2; 3 and a prole of strategies. The dynamics_KWle saves
this prole and uses it as a new initial guess for the overall population. After each iteration,
the dynamics_KWle computes the di¤erences between vector i (t) and  i(t). When no
discrepancy is noticed, the iteration is stopped, the resulting trajectory of strategies and of
the assets distribution is recorded as an equilibrium, and all remaining variables (acceptabil-
ity, consumption, etc.) are computed along such a trajectory. In both the backward and
forward les, the ordinary di¤erential equations are computed at a xed 0.0001 time-step of
a year. The Runge-Kutta approximation method with adjustable steps, readily available in
Matlab, is not used because it would require an additional layer of coding to synchronize the
timing in the backward_ode_kw89and forward_ode_kw89les.
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